In this paper we introduce three alternative combinatorial formulations of the theory of evidence (ToE), by proving that both plausibility and commonality functions share the structure of "sum function" with belief functions. We compute their Moebius inverses, which we call basic plausibility and commonality assignments. As these results are achieved in the framework of the geometric approach to uncertainty measures, the equivalence of the associated formulations of the ToE is mirrored by the geometric congruence of the related simplices. We can then describe the point-wise geometry of these sum functions in terms of rigid transformations mapping them onto each other. Combination rules can be applied to plausibility and commonality functions through their Moebius inverses, leading to interesting applications of such inverses to the probabilistic transformation problem.
Introduction
Uncertainty measures are of paramount importance in the field of artificial intelligence, where problems involving formalized reasoning are common. During the last decades a number of different descriptions of uncertainty have been proposed, as either alternatives to or extensions of classical probability theory. These include probability intervals [19] , credal sets, monotone capacities [41] , random sets [26] . New original foundations of subjective probability in behavioral terms [40, 39] or by means of game theory [31] have been proposed. The theory of evidence (ToE) is one of the most popular such formalisms. It has been introduced in the late Seventies by Glenn Shafer [28] as a way of representing epistemic knowledge, starting from a sequence of seminal works [10, 12, 13] of Arthur Dempster. In this formalism uncertainty is described by belief functions rather than probability distributions. Belief functions assign probability values to sets of possibilities rather than single events. Variants or continuous extensions of the ToE in terms of hints [23] or allocations of probability [29] have later been proposed.
From a combinatorial point of view, belief functions can be seen as sum functions, i.e. functions on the power set 2 Θ = {A ⊆ Θ} of a finite domain Θ
induced by a non-negative basic probability assignment m b : 2 Θ → [0, 1]. The degree of belief of a certain event A is obtained by summing the contributions of all basic probabilities of its subsets B. Combinatorially, a basic probability assignment is the Moebius inverse of a belief function [1] . A sum function can be seen as the discrete counterpart of the indefinite integral in calculus, and Moebius inversion as the discrete counterpart of the derivative. From the point of view of subjective probability, the same evidence associated with a belief function is carried by the related plausibility functions. Such equivalent (from an evidential perspective) functions, however, lack a similar coherent mathematical characterization.
Contribution
In this paper we introduce two alternative combinatorial formulations of the theory of evidence, by proving that both plausibility and commonality functions share with belief functions the structure of sum function. In particular we compute their Moebius inverses, which it is natural to call basic plausibility and commonality assignments respectively. We obtain this result by resorting to a geometric approach to the theory of evidence in which belief functions are represented by points of a simplex, called belief space [7] . As a belief function b : 2 Θ → [0, 1] is completely specified by its N − 2 belief values {b(A), ∅ A Θ}, N . = 2 |Θ| , it can be seen as a point of R N −2 . Besides giving the overall mathematical structure of the theory of evidence an elegant symmetry, the notions of basic plausibility and commonality assignment turn out to be useful in problems involving the combination of plausibility or commonality functions. This is the case for the problem of transforming a belief function into a probability distribution [25, 32, 38, 37, 2, 3, 5] , or when computing the canonical decomposition of support functions [35, 24] . Moreover, as they are discovered through geometric methods, basic plausibility and commonality assignments inherit the same simplicial geometry of belief functions. The equivalence of the associated formulations of the ToE is then geometrically mirrored by the congruence of those simplices. In particular, the relation between upper and lower probabilities (so important in subjective probability) can be geometrically expressed as a simple rigid transformation.
Paper outline
First (Section 2) we recall the basic notions of the theory of evidence, in particular the key ideas of belief, plausibility, and commonality functions. We then briefly present (Section 3) the geometric approach to the ToE and the concept of belief space B, as the set of all the belief functions definable on a give frame. Section 4 forms the core of the paper. We introduce there the notions of basic plausibility (Section 4.1) and commonality (4.2) assignments as Moebius inverses of plausibility and commonality functions respectively, which turn out themselves to be sum functions on the partially ordered set 2 Θ . As a consequence (Section 5) the geometric approach to uncertainty can be extended to plausibility and commonality functions, and the simplicial structure of the related spaces recovered. In Section 6 some interesting applications of basic plausibility assignments to the approximation problem are analyzed in some detail. Finally (Section 7) we show that the equivalence of the proposed alternative formulations of the ToE is reflected by the congruence of the corresponding simplices in the geometric framework. We also discuss the point-wise geometry of the triplet (b, pl b , Q b ) in terms of the rigid transformation mapping them onto each other, as a geometric nexus between the proposed models. A running example concerning a simple binary frame is used throughout the paper to illustrate and anticipate the properties of plausibility and commonality functions.
2 Belief, plausibility, and commonality functions Even though belief functions can be given several alternative but equivalent definitions in terms of multi-valued mappings [30] , random sets [26, 20] , inner measures [27, 15] , in Shafer's formulation [28] a central role is played by the notion of basic probability assignment. A basic probability assignment (b.p.a.) over a finite set (frame of discernment [28] ) Θ is a function m : 2
Subsets of Θ associated with non-zero values of m are called focal elements.
associated with a basic probability assignment m b on Θ is defined as:
A probability function (or Bayesian belief function) is a special b.f. assigning non-zero masses only to singletons :
Functions of the form (1) on a partially ordered set are called sum functions [1] . A belief function b is then the sum function associated with a basic probability assignment m b on the partially ordered set (2 Θ , ⊆). Conversely, the unique basic probability assignment m b associated with a given belief function b can be recovered by means of the Moebius inversion formula
Therefore, there is a 1-1 correspondence between the two set functions m b ↔ b.
A sum function can be seen as the discrete counterpart of the indefinite integral in calculus, and Moebius inversion as the discrete counterpart of the derivative. A dual mathematical representation of the evidence encoded by a belief function b is provided by the plausibility function
, where the plausibility pl b (A) of an event A is given by
and expresses the amount of evidence not against A. We will denote by m b , pl b the b.p.a. and pl.f. uniquely associated with a belief function b. A third mathematical model of the evidence carried by a belief function is represented by the commonality function (comm.f.)
, where the commonality number Q b (A) can be interpreted as the amount of mass which can move freely through the entire event A,
Example
Let us consider a belief function b on a frame of size 3, Θ = {x, y, z} with b.p.a. (see Figure 1 )
The belief values of b on all the possible events of Θ are, according to Equation (1),
To appreciate the difference between belief, plausibility, and commonality values let us consider in particular the event A = {x, y}. Its belief value
represent the amount of evidence which surely supports {x, y}. The total mass b(A) is guaranteed to involve only elements of A = {x, y}. On the other side,
measures the evidence not surely against it. The plausibility value pl b (A) accounts for the mass that might be assigned to some element of A. Finally, the commonality number
tells us what amount of evidence which can (possibly) equally support each of the outcomes in A = {x, y} (i.e. x and y).
A geometric approach to uncertainty
In the theory of evidence the question of how to approximate a belief function with a probability naturally arises. This problem can be posed in a geometric setting by investigating the shape of the space belief functions live [7, 5, 8] .
Results and scope of the geometric approach, though, go well beyond this original application. The relationship between ToE and convex geometry forces us to reflect on what this implies in terms of the deep meaning of the evidential machinery itself. Here we make use of geometric methods to prove the structure of sum function of both plausibility and commonality functions.
Belief space
Let us first review the basic ideas of the geometric approach to uncertainty [7] . It is easy to see that the vectors {b A , ∅ A ⊆ Θ} representing all the categorical belief functions are affinely independent in R N −2 . It follows that B is a simplex there. Moreover, each vector b ∈ B which represents a belief function can be written as a convex combination of the vertices b A of the belief space as follows [7] :
Geometrically, a basic probability assignment is the set of simplicial coordinates of the associated belief function b in B. The simplicial form of B is the geometric counterpart of the nature of belief functions as sum functions admitting Moebius inverse.
The set P of all the Bayesian b.f.s is an n − 1-dimensional face (n . = |Θ|) of B, in particular the simplex determined by all the categorical b.f.s associated with singletons
The case of unnormalized belief functions
In the practical use of the theory of evidence, people often consider unnormalized belief functions (u.b.f.s) [33] , i.e. belief functions admitting non-zero support m b (∅) = 0 for the empty set. The mass assigned to the empty set can be indeed interpreted as an indicator of the amount of conflict in the evidence carried by a belief function, or the possibility that the current frame of discernment does not exhaust all the possible outcomes of the problem. Unnormalized belief functions are then naturally associated with vectors with N = 2 |Θ| coordinates, as b(∅) cannot be neglected anymore. We can then extend the set of categorical belief functions as follows
The analysis of Section 3 retains though its validity: the space of unnormalized b.f.s is again a simplex in R N , namely
The affine subspace generated by the points
If v 1 , ..., v k generate an affine space of dimension k they are said to be affinely independent. 2 With a harmless abuse of notation we denote the categorical belief function associated with a singleton x by bx instead of b {x} . Accordingly we will write
Running example: the binary case
To get some insight on the properties and geometric shape of the belief space, it may be useful to have first a look at how belief functions defined on a frame of discernment with just two elements Θ 2 = {x, y} can be represented as points of R 2 .
In this very simple case each belief function b : 2
We can then collect them in a vector
the set B 2 of all the possible belief functions on Θ 2 can be depicted as the triangle in the Cartesian plane of Figure 2 . Its vertices are the points
which correspond (through Equation (7) 
Two alternative formulations of the theory of evidence
Plausibility and commonality functions are both equivalent representations of the evidence carried by a belief function. It is therefore natural to guess that they should share with belief functions the combinatorial form of sum function on the power set 2 Θ . As a matter of fact, we can use results and tools provided by the geometric interpretation of the ToE to develop alternative models of uncertainty, in parallel to the standard formulation of the ToE. Evidence is there represented by cumulating basic probabilities on intervals of events {B ⊆ A} (yielding a belief value b(A) = B⊆A m(B)). Equivalently, we can represent pieces of evidence as basic plausibility (commonality) assignments on the power set, and compute the related plausibility (commonality) set function by integrating basic assignments over similar intervals. In order to be able to do so, we need to compute the Moebius inverse of both pl.f.s and comm.f.s. We achieve this goal in the framework of the geometric approach introduced in Section 3.
Plausibility functions as sum functions
As it is the case for belief functions, plausibility functions are completely specified by their N − 2 plausibility values {pl b (A), ∅ A Θ} and can then be represented as a vector of R N −2 :
where {X A : ∅ A Θ} is a reference frame in the Cartesian space R N −2 . The categorical belief functions {b A : ∅ A Θ} form a set of independent vectors in R N −2 , so that the collections {X A } and {b A } represent two distinct coordinate frames in B. To understand where a plausibility vector is located in the belief reference frame {b A , ∅ A Θ} we need to compute the coordinate change between these two frames.
Lemma 1. The coordinate change between the two coordinate frames {X
A : ∅ A Θ} and {b A : ∅ A Θ} is given by X A = B⊇A (−1) |B\A| b B .(9)
Basic plausibility assignment
We can use Lemma 1 to compute the Moebius inverse of a plausibility function, by putting (8) in the form of Equation (6). By replacing expression (9) for X A into Equation (8) we get
After introducing the quantity
(where we inverted the role of A and B for sake of homogeneity of the notation), we can write
Incidentally, as
It is natural to call the function µ b : 2 Θ → R defined by expression (10) basic plausibility assignment (b.pl.a.). It is also easy to recognize in (10) the Moebius equation for plausibilities. Immediately:
PL.F.s are then sum functions on 2 Θ of the form (12), whose Moebius inverse is the b.pl.a. (10) . Basic probabilities and plausibilities are obviously related.
As b.p.a.s do, basic plausibility assignments meet the normalization constraint. In other words, pl.f.s are normalized sum functions [1] :
However, unlike its counterpart m b , µ b is not guaranteed to be non-negative.
Example of basic plausibility assignment
Let us consider as an example a belief function b on the binary frame Θ 2 = {x, y} with b.p.a.
The corresponding plausibility vector in R N −2 is
Using Equation (10) we can compute its basic plausibility assignment as
confirming that b.pl.a. meet the normalization but not the positivity constraint. We can infer from Equation (11) that, geometrically, each plausibility vector lies on the affine subspace generated by the categorical belief functions {b A }, with affine coordinates {µ b (A)} given by its basic plausibility assignment.
Relation between basic probability and plausibility assignments
Basic probability and plausibility assignments are linked by a rather elegant relation.
Proof.
Commonality functions as sum functions
It is straightforward to prove that commonality functions are also sum functions and sport some interesting similarities with plausibility functions. They present though some peculiarities we need to take care of. We know that belief functions and pl.f.s are such that
In other words, both b and pl b can be represented as vectors with N − 2 coordinates. On the other side
so that Q b needs N coordinates to be represented (even though the dimension of Q is still N − 2). The geometric counterpart of a commonality function is then the vector of
where {X A : ∅ ⊆ A ⊆ Θ} is the extended reference frame introduced in the case of unnormalized belief functions (A = Θ, ∅ this time included).
Basic commonality assignment
We can, as before, express Q b as a sum function by computing its Moebius inverse. We can use Lemma 1 to change the coordinate base and get the coordinates of Q b with respect to the base {b A , ∅ ⊆ A ⊆ Θ} formed by all the categorical u.b.f.s. We get
It is natural to call the above quantity the basic commonality assignment (b.comm.a.) associated with a belief function b. To arrive at its explicit form we just need to replace the definition of Q b (A) into its expression. We obtain:
Properties of basic commonality assignments
Basic commonality assignments do not meet the normalization axiom, as
In other words, whereas belief functions are normalized sum functions (n.s.f.) with non-negative Moebius inverse, and plausibility functions are normalized sum functions, commonality functions are combinatorially unnormalized sum functions. Going back to the example of Section 4.1.2, the b.comm.a. associated with m b (x) = 1/3, m b (Θ) = 2/3 is (by Equation (16))
Geometry of plausibilities and commonalities
We have seen that the theory of evidence can be given alternative formulations in terms of plausibility and commonality assignments. This result has been achieved by geometric means. A reverse relation takes also place as plausibility and commonality functions, just like belief functions, can be given geometric descriptions in terms of simplices strictly related to the original belief space.
Plausibility space
Plausibility functions can be seen as points of R N −2 (Section 4.1). We can then call plausibility space the region PL of R N −2 whose points correspond to admissible pl.f.s. 
Proof. We just need to re-assemble expression (11) as a convex combination of points. We get (by means of Equation (13)):
The latter is indeed a convex combination, since basic probability assignments are non-negative (but m b (∅ = 0)) and have unitary sum. Accordingly,
(after exchanging C with A to keep the notation consistent).
It is easy to note that pl x = −(−1) |x| b x = b x ∀x ∈ Θ, so that B ∩ PL ⊃ P (Figure 4) . The vertices of the plausibility space have a natural interpretation. 
Proof. Expression (17) is equivalent to
Now, if A ∩ C = ∅ then there is no addenda in the above sum, which goes to zero. Otherwise, for Newton's binomial (14), we have that
On the other side, by definition of upper probability,
and the two quantities coincide.
It is interesting to consider also the case of unnormalized belief functions. As a matter of fact, it can be seen that Theorems 1 and 4 fully retain their validity. However, in the case of Theorem 3, as in general m b (∅) = 0 we need to modify Equation (18) by adding a term related to the empty set. This yields
where pl C , C = ∅ is still given by Equation (17) , and pl ∅ = 0 is the origin of R N . Note that even in the case of unnormalized belief functions (Equation (17)) the empty set is not considered, for µ(∅) = 0.
Running example: the binary case
It can be useful to go back to the simple case study of a binary frame Θ 2 = {x, y}, and relate the structures of B and PL there. Figure 5 shows the geometry of belief and plausibility spaces for a binary frame Θ 2 = {x, y}, where belief and plausibility vectors are points of a plane with coordinates
respectively. These two simplices
are symmetric with respect to P and congruent, so that they can be moved onto each other by means of a rigid transformation. In this simple case, this rigid transformation is just a reflection through the Bayesian segment P. From Figure 5 it is clear how each individual pair of functions (b, pl b ) determines a line a(b, pl b ) which is orthogonal to P, on which they lay on symmetric positions on the two sides of the Bayesian subspace.
Commonality space
Analogously we can use basic commonality assignments (16) to recover the shape of the space Q ⊂ R N of all the commonality functions. We obtain:
is the A-the vertex of the commonality space, which is hence given by
Again, Q A is the commonality function associated with the categorical belief function b A , i.e.,
the two quantities coincide.
Running example: the binary case
In the binary case Q 2 needs N = 2 2 = 4 coordinates to be represented. We have indeed
The commonality space Q 2 can then be drawn (if we neglect the coordinate Q b (∅) which is constant ∀b) as in Figure 6 . The vertices of Q 2 are, according to Equation (19)
Applications
The geometric approach provides us with a useful tool (even though surely not the only one) to complete the combinatorial apparatus of the theory of evidence. The three equivalent descriptions of the evidence represented by belief, plausibility and commonality functions are proven to possess the same combinatorial structure of sum functions. As such, they possess Moebius inverses called basic probability, plausibility, and commonality assignments. Immediately, then, the aggregation operators that apply to belief functions through their Moebius inverse (the b.p.a.) can be extended to the combination of plausibility or commonality functions (Section 6.1). As an entire class of probabilistic approximations of belief functions relates to such operators (and to Dempster's rule [12, 11] in particular), this has consequences on the probability transformation problem (Section 6.2). As significant examples we will discuss in more detail the properties enjoyed by two probability transformations called "relative belief of singletons" [6] (Section 6.2.1) and "intersection probability" [5] (Section 6.2.2).
Combination of plausibility functions
Historically, different combination rules have been proposed to merge the evidence carried by different belief functions, starting from Dempster's original proposal [12] . 
We denote by k(b 1 , b 2 ) the denominator of (20) . Different operators have been later brought forward, notably in the context of the Transferable Belief Model [34] . 
Their conjunctive combination is the belief function b 1 ∪ b 2 with b.p.a.:
Obviously Dempster's sum, disjunctive and conjunctive rules can be applied to any pair ς 1 , ς 2 of (normalized) sum functions. We just need to apply (20) , (21) , or (22) to their Moebius inverses m ς 1 , m ς 2 . In particular, they can be applied to plausibility functions through their Moebius inverses, i.e., their basic plausibility assignments (10).
The probability transformation problem
One of the central issues in the theory of evidence is the problem of approximating a complex object such as a belief function with a standard probability distribution [42, 14, 18, 37, 25, 2, 32, 38, 3] .
Dual properties of relative belief and plausibility of singletons
One interesting approach to the probability transformation problem seeks approximations which enjoy commutativity properties with respect to a specific combination rule, in particular Dempster's sum [12, 11] (Equation 20 ). Voorbraak was the first to explore this direction, proposing the adoption of the so-called relative plausibility of singletons [38] :
It can indeed be proven that (23) 
In other words, Dempster's sum and relative plausibility commute.
A dual transformation called relative belief of singletons
can be introduced by simply swapping plausibility values for belief values. It can proven that, as a consequence, (24) meets properties which are the dual of those expressed by Propositions 2 and 3. However, as such properties involve the combination of plausibility functions, they rely on their Moebius inverse: the basic plausibility assignment. We first need to recall a useful result on Dempster's sum of affine combinations [8] .
of a belief function b with any 3 affine combination of belief functions can be written as
where Proof. By Equation (11) we can express a plausibility function as an affine combination in terms of its basic plausibility assignment:
We can then apply the commutativity property (25) of Lemma 2, obtaining
where
Once replaced these expressions in (27) we get
again by Equation (15) . But this is exactlyb ⊕ p, as a direct application of Dempster's rule (20) shows.
Proposition 5. The relative belief operator
mapping a plausibility function to the corresponding relative belief of singletons (24) , commutes with respect to Dempster's combination of plausibility functions:
Proof. The basic plausibility assignment of pl 1 ⊕ pl 2 is, according to (20) ,
Then according to Theorem 2 the corresponding relative belief of singletons
(28) where m pl1⊕pl2 (x) denotes the Moebius inverse of the normalized sum function corresponding to the plausibility function pl 1 ⊕ pl 2 . On the other side, as X⊇{x} µ b (X) = m b (x) by Equation (15),
and by normalizing we get (28) .
Generally speaking, each time it is necessary or convenient to compute combinations of plausibility functions the usefulness of basic plausibility assignments becomes apparent. In particular, this is true when exploring properties obtained by duality, i.e., by exchanging the role of belief and plausibility functions in existing statements. Another example is provided by probability transformations inherently associated with the couple (b, pl b ) . This is the case of the "intersection probability" [5] .
The discovery of the intersection probability
We have seen in Section 3.3 how a pair (b, pl b ) of belief/plausibility functions determines a line that, in the binary case, crosses the set P of probability distributions or "Bayesian" belief functions ( Figure 5 ). In that case the intersection coincides with Smets' pignistic transformation [32] :
This is not the case of general frames of discernment. It is true, however, that the line a(b, pl b ) intersects the set P of Bayesian normalized sum functions (i.e., n.s.f.s ς such that x ς(x) = 1) in a point
Such intersection is uniquely associated with a probability transformation called intersection probability [5] which basic probability assignment
is a scalar function of b. The rationale of the intersection probability is clearer in the framework of probability intervals [9] . A belief function b determines an interval of admissible probability values b(x) ≤ p(x) ≤ pl b (x) for all the elements x ∈ Θ of the domain. As there is no reason to favor any of these elements over the others, it is sensible to seek for a probability transformation of the form
that assigns the same, constant ratio α of the interval width pl b (x) − b(x) to all the elements. The latter is indeed the intersection probability.
A justification for the name of this function p [b] comes from the following result [4] , obtained by expressing pl b as a sum function (12).
Proposition 6. The orthogonal sums of p[b] and ς[b] with any arbitrary probability function
Proof. (sketch) Crucial to the proof of Proposition 6 is being able to compute
is the normalization factor of the standard Dempster's combination b ⊕ p of b and p, while 
A geometric nexus between models
Both plausibility and commonality functions can then be thought of as sum functions on the partially ordered set 2 Θ (even though whereas belief and plausibility functions are normalized sum functions, comm.f.s are not). This in turn allows to describe them as points of some simplices B, PL and Q in a Cartesian space. The relation between these three alternative models of the ToE can be then analyzed from a geometrical point of view. In this last part of the paper, in particular, we show that the equivalence of such models as descriptions of uncertainty is geometrically mirrored by the congruence of the associated simplices.
Congruence
We already know that in the case of a binary frame of discernment, B and PL are congruent, i.e. they can be superposed by means of a rigid transformation (see Section 5.1.1). We may wonder whether this result can be generalized, or whether a similar relation exists between belief and plausibility spaces and the commonality space. We will see that congruence is indeed a general property.
Congruence of belief and plausibility spaces
Let us first consider the relation between belief and plausibility simplices. Cl(b A , b B ) and Cl(pl A , pl B ) of belief and plausibility spaces are congruent, namely
Theorem 5. The corresponding 1-dimensional sides
where p denotes the classical norm
Proof. This a direct consequence of the definition of plausibility function. Let us denote by C, D two generic subsets of Θ. As pl
This in turn means that ∀p:
Notice that the proof of Theorem 5 holds no matter if the couple (∅, ∅ c = Θ) is considered or not. A straightforward implication is then that as their corresponding 1-dimensional faces have the same length. This is due to the generalization of a well-known Euclid's theorem stating that triangles with sides of the same length are congruent. It is worth to notice that, although this holds for simplices (generalized triangles), the same is not true for polytopes in general, i.e. convex closures of a number of vertices greater than n + 1 where n is the dimension of the Cartesian space in which they are defined (think of a square and a rhombus with sides of length 1).
Binary case
Let us then see what happens to belief, plausibility and commonality spaces in the case of unnormalized belief functions defined on a binary frame. All three simplices have N = 2 |Θ| vertices and dimension N − 1:
For a frame Θ = {x, y} of cardinality 2 they form three-dimensional polytopes immersed in a four-dimensional Cartesian space: 
We know from Section 5.1.1 that PL 2 and B 2 are congruent. By Equation (30) it follows that
etcetera, and as B U 2 and PL U 2 are simplices they are also congruent.
Congruence of plausibility and commonality spaces
A similar result holds for plausibility and commonality spaces. We first need to point out the peculiar relationship which exists between the vertices of plausibility and commonality spaces in the u.b.f case, as 
so that the two sides are obviously congruent. has two sides of length 1.
In the unnormalized case instead, recalling Equation (30), 
Point-wise rigid transformation
Belief, plausibility and commonality functions form simplices which can be moved onto each other by means of a rigid transformation, as a reflection of the equivalence of the associated models. It can be interesting to analyze also the geometric behavior of single functions, i.e., of the triplet of associated nonadditive measures (b, pl b , Q b ). In binary case (Section 5.1.1) the point-wise geometry of a plausibility vector can be described in terms of a reflection with respect to the probability simplex P. In the general case, as the simplices B U , PL U , and Q U are all congruent, there must exist an Euclidean transformation τ ∈ E(N ) mapping one simplex onto the other one. Let us explicit its form.
Belief and plausibility spaces
In the case of belief and plausibility spaces (in the standard, normalized case) the rigid transformation is clearly encoded by Equation ( 
In other words: Geometrically, b c is obtained from b by means of another reflection (by swapping the coordinates associated with the axes X A and X A c ), so that the form of the desired transformation is completely determined. Figure 7 illustrates the nature of the transformation, and its instantiation in the binary case for normalized belief functions. In the case of unnormalized belief functions b ∅ = 1, pl ∅ = 0 so that we have
Commonality and plausibility spaces
The form of the point-wise transformation is also quite simple in the case of the pair (PL U , Q U ). We can indeed use Equation (31), getting 
In conclusion, Figure 7 ) is more difficult in this case as R 4 is involved. It is natural to stress the analogy between the two rigid transformations
mapping respectively an unnormalized belief function onto the corresponding plausibility, and an unnormalized pl.f. onto the corresponding commonality function: b
They both have the form of a sequence of two reflections: a swap of the axes of the reference frame {X A } ({b A }) induced by set-theoretic complement, plus a reflection with respect to the center of the segment Cl(0, 1).
Comments and conclusions
In this paper we proved that plausibility and commonality functions share with belief functions the form of sum functions on the partially ordered set 2 Θ . We introduced for both functions their Moebius inverses, that we called basic plausibility and commonality assignments, and used the latter to introduce equivalent alternative combinatorial formulations of the theory of evidence. In a more general perspective, we have shown that the geometric approach to the theory of evidence is just a symptom of a strict relationship between combinatorics and subjective probability. These links have never been systematically explored, even though some work has been recently done in this direction [17, 16, 21] , specially by M. Grabish and his group. The alternative models introduced here can be successfully applied to problems like probabilistic approximation or canonical decomposition. More interestingly, the geometric language in which those results are expressed hints to points of contact with the field of geometric probability [22] (which studies invariant measures on sets of geometric objects and relates them to additive probability measures) that could lead to a fertile contamination of the two fields. For instance, a well-known result [22] states that all simplicial complexes on a partially ordered set form a distributive lattice. As we know that belief, plausibility and commonality functions, but also finite possibility measures form simplicial complexes in 2 Θ (as a simplex is just a principal complex) this could eventually bring to an algebraic interpretation of the mutual relations between all those measures which would mirror the geometric one. 
